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The Effects of a Mixed Approach toward Management Earnings Forecasts: Evidence 
from China 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Chinese regulators mandate management earnings forecasts when managers’ earnings 
expectations meet bright-line thresholds and allow voluntary forecasts in other circumstances. 
We examine the effects of this mixed approach. We find that Chinese mandatory forecasts 
have significant information content. Moreover, we observe a learning effect: mandatory 
forecasts appear to stimulate voluntary forecasts in subsequent periods as managers become 
familiar with the forecasting and disclosing procedures through forced experience. We find 
one negative consequence of the mixed approach, however: managers appear to manipulate 
earnings to avoid the forecast threshold of large earnings decreases. Overall, we document the 
pros and cons of a mixed approach toward management earnings forecasts in a major emerging 
market.  
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1. Introduction
For decades, regulators, managers, and investors have grappled with the question of 
whether financial disclosure should be regulated or left to market forces. The public-good view 
holds that financial disclosure tends to be under-produced even when it is socially desirable 
because the disclosing party bears all the costs but does not reap commensurate benefits 
(Hirshleifer 1971). Regulation can overcome this problem by forcing firms to communicate 
with investors. Applying this argument to specific types of financial disclosure is complicated, 
however, because of the difficulty of identifying and estimating the costs and benefits of a given 
disclosure to the information provider and the recipients.1  
 The regulation of management earnings forecasts (MEF) has attracted regulatory 
attention in many countries. In the US, the SEC considered mandating MEF in the 1970s, and 
the debate on mandatory vs. voluntary disclosure generated a large body of research in the 
1970s and 1980s.2 The proponents of mandatory earnings forecasts argued that the forecasts 
would reduce information asymmetry and level the playing field. Opponents made three 
arguments (Till 1980). First, it is unclear that mandatory earnings forecasts are useful. Managers 
who are forced to disclose may use their discretion to delay or obfuscate the disclosure. Second, 
early disclosure is especially costly for some firms either due to the proprietary costs of 
disclosure or a lack of familiarity with the required procedures. Last, it would be difficult for 
                                                 
1 Dye (1990) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) demonstrate this problem analytically. Dye models the firm’s 
potential shareholders as free riders of the disclosure and shows that a disclosure mandate is not necessarily 
preferable even if disclosure has no proprietary cost. In Admati and Pfleiderer’s model, free riders can use the 
information to value other firms. The authors show that a socially inefficient equilibrium is one of several that 
may exist and that regulation can improve social welfare by eliminating this possibility and establishing 
standards for firms to communicate information to the market (p. 513). They acknowledge that it is difficult to 
design effective regulation to achieve this goal. 
2 See the report of the SEC Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure published on November 3, 1977; 
Daily (1971); McDonald (1973); Burton (1974); Patell (1976); Gonedes, Dopuch, and Penman (1976); Penman 
(1980); Waymire (1984); Pownall and Waymire (1989); etc.    
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regulators to formulate forecast rules that will not be abused. The SEC eventually decided to 
encourage voluntary management forecasts instead of requiring forecasts.3  
In this study we examine the effects of China’s mixed approach toward regulating MEF 
in light of the above arguments. In any capital market, managers arguably know more about the 
firm than do outside investors. Serious information asymmetry could develop if managers 
restrict their disclosures to required periodic financial reports. Previous debates on MEF have 
focused on the choice between using the visible hand (“regulation”) and the invisible hand 
(“market forces”) to alleviate these information problems. Chinese regulators avoid this binary 
choice and use a mixed approach to address the information problems—the visible hand for 
some firms and the invisible hand for others. We examine four economic effects of this mixed 
approach: (1) the usefulness of mandatory forecasts to market participants, (2) the effect of 
forced forecast experience on subsequent-period voluntary forecast behavior, referred to as the 
managerial learning effect, (3) insider trading, and (4) earnings management.4      
Publicly-listed Chinese firms are required to issue forecasts for fiscal-year earnings if 
managers anticipate an earnings increase or decrease of at least 50% from the prior year, a loss, 
or a profit in the current year after reporting a loss in the prior year (“turning profit”). Forecasts 
must be issued by January 31 after the fiscal year end of December 31.5 Firms may issue 
forecasts voluntarily in other circumstances. Thus, the mandatory and voluntary forecast 
                                                 
3 Market forces are an alternative to regulation. Managers’ private information may unravel in a market with few 
frictions, such as one with credible managers, efficient information flow, and rational investors (Grossman 1981). 
While full unravelling only occurs in an ideal world, since 2001 about a quarter of US firms have been issuing 
forecasts of annual earnings, attesting to the strong market forces in the US. Unraveling is less likely in a market 
with many frictions, such as the emerging market of China.  
4 We do not examine the relative usefulness of mandatory vs. voluntary forecasts in this study.  
5 All Chinese firms end their fiscal year on December 31. The deadline for an annual report is April 30, and 75% 
of the financial reports in our sample period were filed after late March. Regulators encourage, but do not require, 
firms to provide mandatory forecasts of annual earnings when they report third-quarter earnings.  
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regimes (hereinafter “M-regime” and “V-regime”) coexist, separated by bright-line earnings 
level and change cutoffs. A firm may be in different regimes from one year to the next.  
The mixed approach toward regulating MEF is novel and could be used by regulators 
across a wide range of economies to address the information problems in their respective 
economies. This may be especially appropriate in emerging markets where the capital markets 
are still developing and market forces are weak. A mixed approach can also be of interest in 
developed economies. 6  The pros and cons of this mixed approach are unclear, however, 
particularly in an emerging market where regulatory enforcement might be weak. Despite five 
decades of research in the US, the literature offers little guidance about the effects of a mixed 
approach because MEF have always been voluntary in the US. Kato, Skinner, and Kunimura 
(2009) provide evidence on MEF in Japan; however, their findings are not applicable to the 
mixed approach because earnings forecasts, along with their timing and precision, are 
effectively mandated for all firms in Japan, leaving managers with little discretion. To the best 
of our knowledge, Taiwan is the only other economy with a mixed mandatory-voluntary 
forecast regime. However, unlike China, earnings forecasts are only mandatory in Taiwan when 
significant events occur. Such events include (1) mergers and acquisitions, (2) replacement of 
more than one-third of the board members, and (3) significant changes in the firm’s stock price. 
In the absence of bright-line forecasting rules based on earnings levels or changes, Taiwanese 
firms likely face quite different reporting incentives from those in China. We gain insights into 
a mixed approach toward MEF by analyzing Chinese data.   
                                                 
6 In fact, some securities regulations in the US already use a mixed approach. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act sets a $75 million public float threshold for firms to meet accelerated filing requirements and to obtain auditor 
attestation of their internal controls for financial reporting. The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 also 
uses thresholds to define categories of firms that are exempt from certain disclosure requirements for going public.  
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In a larger picture, examining MEF in China is important in its own right for three 
reasons. First, China is a large economy that surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest 
economy in 2010, and has since kept growing. The full potential of the Chinese economy may 
only be unlocked by a well-functioning capital market. Second, China’s stock market also 
surpassed Japan in November 2014 to become the second largest one based on total market 
capitalization (Bloomberg 2014). The Chinese stock market influences global capital flows and 
resource allocation (Strumpf and Driebusch 2015). MEF have played a large role in developed 
capital markets and are likely to eventually play a substantial role in the Chinese capital 
market.7 Third, China has experienced growing pains in developing its capital market, and our 
study provides feedback on a major disclosure regulation in this market.  
We collect MEF of fiscal-year earnings issued by Chinese companies from 2004 to 2011 
and classify firm-years in the M- or V-regime based on their reported earnings relative to the 
four forecast-mandate thresholds. We classify forecasts as mandatory if the issuing firms’ 
earnings fall in the earnings regions prescribed by the mandate and classify other forecasts as 
voluntary. Regulators enacted the mandate to expedite the disclosure of material information, 
and this is what we observe—81 to 85% of the firms in the M-regime issue forecasts, compared 
with 18 to 22% in the V-regime. The forecast mandate appears to expedite the disclosure of 
material corporate information to investors by at least three months—the interval between the 
forecast deadline and the annual financial report deadline.  
Although the mandate appears to expedite disclosures, there is no guarantee that the 
resulting forecasts are useful to market participants. Managers who are forced to provide 
information might use their discretion to obfuscate the disclosure and reduce its usefulness. So, 
                                                 
7 For example, Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010, p.300) conclude that in the past decade or so MEF provided 
about 55% of the accounting information available to US investors. 
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we first investigate the usefulness of mandatory forecasts by examining investor and analyst 
reactions at the mandatory-forecast date. We find that stock prices react significantly to 
mandatory forecasts and are in a direction consistent with the forecast news. When forecasting 
firms subsequently report earnings, investors react to the remaining earnings surprise, that is, 
the difference between reported earnings and the previously disclosed earnings forecast. We 
find that financial analysts respond to mandatory forecasts by immediately issuing or revising 
their earnings forecasts for the forthcoming year and that analyst forecast dispersion decreases 
substantially after the release of mandatory forecasts. Thus, market participants find mandatory 
forecasts useful.   
Second, we examine the effects of mandatory forecasts on managerial learning. 
Managers can learn to comply more efficiently with new accounting rules, and can also learn 
new information from complying with the rules (e.g. Shroff, 2017). Although firms plan their 
use of resources, including cash, for internal operations, such information is not necessarily 
aggregated at the corporate level in a form that is suitable for external reporting. The demand 
for managers to estimate financial reporting-compliant earnings before the fiscal period ends 
arises externally. Managers can learn about reporting procedures by producing forecasts for 
external users. Chinese managers should have incentives to learn the craft of improving and 
publicly releasing earnings projections because violating the forecast regulation may result in 
significant negative market reaction, a ban from issuing shares in the next 12 months, and 
reputational and career damages to the managers.8 Moreover, given the popularity of MEF in 
developed markets, Chinese managers may wish to learn how to use this disclosure tool to 
appeal to their investors. Managers who invest additional resources to comply with the 
                                                 
8  The 51 firms that the CSMAR database shows as having been sanctioned for annual forecast violations 
experienced a statistically significant median return of -2.5% in the three-day window around the sanction.  
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regulation and go through the steps of issuing mandatory forecasts are likely to learn new 
forecasting procedures that could reduce their subsequent direct disclosure costs, in turn 
increasing the likelihood of issuing voluntary forecasts in the future (see the corollary in 
Verrecchia 1983). Thus, we expect current-year V-regime firms that had forced forecast 
experience in the prior year (the “treatment group”) to be more likely to forecast and provide 
higher-quality forecasts than current-year V-regime firms that were not required to forecast in 
the prior year (the “benchmark group”). Both groups are in the V-regime in the current year, 
and their contrasting forecast experience in the prior year is due to the mandate. 
The treatment and benchmark groups differ on several observable firm characteristics. 
To address this self-selection issue, we use the propensity-score matching method to identify a 
control observation from the benchmark group for each treatment observation. We find that 
firms in the treatment group are more likely to provide voluntary forecasts in the current year 
than firms in the matched control group. In addition, when we condition on voluntary forecast 
issuance, we find that firms in the treatment group issue more timely forecasts than firms in the 
matched control group. We find no difference in forecast precision and forecast accuracy 
between the two groups, though, after controlling for forecast timeliness. We conclude that 
forced forecast experience facilitates managers’ learning and thus increases the likelihood and 
timeliness of subsequent voluntary forecasts.  
In supplementary tests, we match a control firm with a treatment firm in the same 
category of state-owned enterprise (SOE) or non-SOE firms. We find similar learning effects 
for SOEs and non-SOEs regarding the likelihood of issuing subsequent-period voluntary 
forecasts. We find a learning effect on the timeliness of subsequent-period voluntary forecasts 
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only for non-SOEs. Our findings suggest that mandatory forecasts increase the quantity and 
timeliness of voluntary forecasts, primarily benefiting investors of non-SOEs.  
The third effect we examine is insider trading. A major argument for mandating 
forecasts is to level the playing field. Chinese regulators are concerned that, without mandatory 
forecasts, corporate insiders would take advantage of the increasing information asymmetry 
between regulatory financial report dates. We examine whether mandatory forecasts affect 
insider trading. Our insider trading data are from 2007-2011. For firms that provide mandatory 
forecasts (mandatory forecast group), we collect the aggregate trading share percentage of 
company executives and directors from 30 days before the mandatory-forecast date to 30 days 
afterwards. We collect data separately on sales and purchase transactions and on companies 
with good news versus bad news. We select non-forecasting firms in the V-regime as our 
control group and assign a pseudo-event date that is the median forecast date of the mandatory 
forecast group. Although insiders of mandatory-forecast firms appear to delay their stock sales 
around good-news forecasts until after the forecast deadline, insider transactions are generally 
infrequent. Thus, the forecast mandate appears to have little effect on insider trading. 
The last issue we investigate is the effect of bright-line thresholds used in the mixed 
approach. One argument against mandatory forecasts is that it is challenging for regulators to 
make rules that will not be abused. This may be especially true for a mixed approach. Managers 
who are reluctant to issue forecasts may manage earnings to avoid the bright-line thresholds 
specified in the forecast mandate. Managers may also manage earnings to cover up their failure 
to anticipate, and therefore forecast, significant earnings news as required by the regulation. 
The forecast regulation uses bright-line earnings thresholds to determine whether a firm-year is 
in the M- or V-regime. Reticent managers may exploit financial reporting discretion and 
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manipulate reported earnings to avoid issuing forecasts or cover their failure to issue forecasts 
when they should. We find evidence that after the mandate took effect, some firms managed 
earnings to avoid the 50% earnings decrease forecast threshold. This finding suggests that 
another negative consequence of the mixed approach is that it induces earnings management to 
avoid the bright-line forecast threshold of earnings decreases.   
Our study makes two contributions to the literature. First, we provide feedback on one 
of the most important disclosure regulations in China.9 We find that mandatory forecasts have 
significant information content and that forced forecast experience increases the likelihood and 
timeliness of voluntary forecasts in subsequent periods, especially for non-SOE firms. These 
findings are signs of success of the forecast regulation. On the other hand, we find evidence of 
earnings management induced by the bright-line threshold for mandatory forecasts of earnings 
decreases. These findings show the negative consequences of the forecast regulation. Overall, 
out study provides feedback to Chinese regulators.  
Second, our study provides guidance to other markets, especially emerging markets. 
Despite some unique characteristics of the Chinese stock market, our findings could be useful 
for other emerging markets (e.g., South Korea, Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa) because the 
private (non-governmental) sectors across emerging markets face similar information problems 
and would benefit most from well-functioning capital markets. Thus, the evidence from our 
study may be useful to regulators and investors in other emerging markets.  
                                                 
9 There is limited management forecast research published in the accounting literature in China. Jiang, Tong, and 
Yang (2003) test the market reaction to warnings; Qin (2004) discusses forecasts by IPO firms; Guo and Qi (2010) 
examine the accruals management of forecasting firms; and Song (2009) and Song, Li, and Ji (2011) report the 
penalties for forecast violations.   
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2. Institutional background 
As an emerging market, China has experienced phenomenal growth in its capital market 
in the past two decades, with a doubling of the number of listed companies and a ten-fold 
increase in stock market capitalization to about $6 trillion at the end of 2011. China’s stock 
market plays a vital role in supporting overall economic growth (e.g. Carpenter et al. 2015). 
Research suggests that even though the Chinese stock market responds to accounting 
information, it is not as informationally efficient as the US market.10 A further concern is that 
mechanisms for reducing information asymmetry were not fully developed in China during our 
sample period. For example, before 1998, Chinese firms rarely forecasted or disclosed earnings 
before the mandated report date, and financial analysts seldom issued earnings forecasts (Xue 
2001). As recently as 2004, only 40% of Chinese firms were covered by analysts, though 
coverage increased to 91% in 2011.11 Short selling and arbitrage forces are more limited in 
China than in the US. These frictions have limited the role of market forces in addressing the 
information problems, thus increasing the importance of regulation.   
Chinese regulators have attempted to reduce information asymmetry in three ways. 
First, they encourage, but do not require, companies to adopt practices that are common in 
developed countries, such as announcing earnings before regulatory filings. With the Chinese 
stock exchanges’ encouragement, the percentage of firms announcing earnings before the filing 
date increased from 5% in 2004 to 52% in 2011. Second, the regulators control market activities 
                                                 
10 Huang and Li (2014) find that Chinese firms experience significant return reaction and trading volume when 
annual earnings are reported, but have more information leakage prior to the report date and more prolonged return 
drift after the report date than US firms. Du, Tang, and Zhang (2014) find that the earnings-return correlations for 
a given return interval are lower in China than in the US. 
11 A survey of individual investors indicates that they rank analyst research reports as only the fourth most 
important information resource after price movements, media, and corporate disclosure (Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
2011). Both the media and academic research have questioned the credibility of analyst reports in China (Pan and 
Wu 2011; Gu, Li, and Yang 2013).  
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using a central-planner’s mindset. For example, the Chinese IPO market has been tightly 
controlled by the central government and heavily bottlenecked because of regulatory scrutiny 
of new listings (Hong 2016). Last, the regulators use a mixed approach of regulation and market 
forces, such as the approach toward MEF.  
In December 2000, Chinese stock exchanges required firms to expedite information 
release by issuing warnings if managers anticipate a loss for the current year. In December 
2001, the exchanges expanded the scope of mandatory forecasts to include anticipated large 
earnings changes (i.e., an earnings increase or decrease of at least 50% from the previous year). 
In 2004, another circumstance for mandatory forecasts was added: anticipated profit for the 
current year after a loss in the prior year. These earnings change and level thresholds define 
earnings information that regulators deem especially material. 12 Managers may voluntarily 
issue earnings forecasts in other circumstances.  
The stock exchanges provide forms to standardize forecast releases, and require firms 
to update a previously issued earnings forecast if the reason for the forecast has changed or if 
the new estimate differs by 50% or more from the previous estimate. The requirement for 
updating obsolete forecasts applies to both mandatory and voluntary forecasts. Regulators may 
punish firms that omit or delay mandatory forecasts or issue inaccurate mandatory or voluntary 
forecasts, often by publicly denouncing a violating company along with its executives and 
directors. To restore investors’ trust, the company typically issues an apology in a national 
newspaper (Qin 2004). Prior research finds, however, that the enforcement of forecast rules is 
                                                 
12 In private communication, an official who was employed at the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) when the forecast rules were made stated that their main purpose was to reduce information asymmetry 
and protect investors from being exploited by informationally advantaged parties. 
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weak: only a small percentage of violations have been sanctioned, mostly for failure to forecast 
bad news (Song 2009; Song et al. 2011).13  
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our data source for Chinese forecasts of annual earnings is RESSET, a commercial 
database covering MEF and financial reporting of publicly traded Chinese companies.14 The 
database coverage begins in 2002. Appendix 1 presents an example of MEF, translated from 
the original press release. Most forecasts (56%) are of earnings levels and the remainder are of 
earnings changes, which we convert to earnings levels for consistency.15 We collect financial 
and stock price data from CSMAR database. We start our sample period in 2004 to ensure that 
all the forecast rules were in effect and end the sample period in 2011. Our sample starts with 
A shares listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 2004-2011, a total of 
13,248 firm-years. We exclude 1,114 IPO firms and 751 firms that report an EPS of RMB0.05 
or less in the prior year (and are exempted from the earnings-change forecast rule). Our sample 
is reduced to 11,383 firm-years.  
The database does not distinguish between mandatory and voluntary forecasts. We use 
reported earnings to classify a firm-year into either the M- or V-regime, as demonstrated in 
Appendix 2, and refer to forecasts issued in the M-regime as “mandatory forecasts” and those 
                                                 
13 According to the sanctions data available from the CSMAR database, 51 companies were denounced for annual 
forecast violations during our sample period and all of these cases were related to bad news.   
14 To check the accuracy of the dataset, we randomly sampled 50 observations and were able to verify the MEF 
and major accounting variables using the original forecast announcements and financial reports. We discovered 
and made adjustments for a recording irregularity in the database about range forecasts: for an earnings increase 
forecast, say 30% to 50%, the database records “30%” in the first column and “50%” in the second column; for an 
earnings decrease forecast of -30% to -50%, the database records “-30%” in the first column and “-50%” in the 
second column.     
15 Managers provide an estimate of earnings per share (EPS) in addition to an estimate of total earnings for only 
9% of the forecasts.  
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in the V-regime as “voluntary forecasts.” 16 The mandatory requirements are based on the 
assumption that by January 31, managers have perfect foresight for earnings. To the extent that 
this assumption does not hold, two types of mismatch occur. The first type is a “false alarm,” 
where the stated forecast falls into one of the four mandatory categories, but realized earnings 
do not qualify for the M-regime. For example, a firm forecasted an earnings decrease of 60% 
but the actual earnings decrease is only 30%. We exclude 390 false alarms and have 10,993 
firm-years remaining. The second type of mismatch is “inconsistent mandatory forecasts” 
(ICF): a firm belonging to one of the four mandatory categories provides a prediction indicating 
either a different type of mandatory forecast or a voluntary forecast. For example, realized 
earnings decrease by 60% from the previous year, but the firm forecasted a decrease of 30% (a 
V-regime category). Such observations account for 4% of the M-regime firm-years; we tabulate 
ICF in Table 1 for completeness but exclude them from subsequent analyses.  
We present Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 1 and 2 to summarize the sample of 10,993 firm-
years, from which we select a subset for our empirical analysis. Panel A of Table 1 shows the 
5,317 firm-years in the M-regime, with separate columns for CF (consistent mandatory 
forecast), ICF, and NF (no forecast). The compliance rate (CF%) is the percentage of CF firms 
in a given M-regime category and ranges from 81% to 90% during the sample period. The 
compliance rates for “loss” and “turning profit” are higher than those for large earnings 
increases/decreases perhaps because the former receive more scrutiny from regulators. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the 5,676 firm-years in the V-regime, with separate columns 
for F (forecast) and NF (no forecast) observations. The forecast rates (F%) for both the earnings 
                                                 
16 If a firm issues more than one type of mandatory forecast for the same year (e.g., forecasting a loss and an 
earnings decrease of at least 50%), we prioritize “loss” and “turning profit” over the other categories because of 
the importance of zero as a performance benchmark in China.   
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decrease and earnings increase categories climb rapidly during our sample period from 2% in 
2004 to about 40% in 2011. In the last three years of the sample period, the forecast rate for 
earnings increases is clearly higher than that for earnings decreases, consistent with the 
economic theory that managers are more likely to disclose good news than bad news 
(Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1985).  
To provide context for interpreting the above forecast rates, we report MEF statistics 
for US firms over the same period as our Chinese sample. We select US firms in Compustat 
with non-missing total assets, stock price, the number of shares outstanding, and earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations, and obtain these firms’ MEF from First Call’s 
Company Issued Guidelines database. Although there are vast differences in the two countries’ 
information environments, the US analysis serves two purposes. One is to serve as a benchmark 
for the MEF behavior in China. For example, is the Chinese forecast rate of 40% high or low 
relative to the rate in developed markets? The second is to describe variation in forecast 
behavior within the US across the earnings change regions similar to those of Chinese 
companies. This enables us to determine whether US firms tend to withhold earnings forecasts 
in the circumstances identified by Chinese regulators as warranting mandatory disclosure.   
Panel A of Figure 1 depicts the Chinese forecast rate across earnings changes. Chinese 
firms exhibit a U shape with the base ranging from 10 to 30% for voluntary forecasts and crests 
of up to 100% that are elevated by the forecast mandate for large-percentage earnings changes. 
Waymire (1985) finds that managers are reluctant to forecast in highly uncertain situations even 
though the demand for corporate disclosure peaks at these times. In other words, managers’ 
voluntary supply of information dwindles precisely when the demand for such information is 
highest. Consistent with Waymire’s finding, Panel B of Figure 1 shows the inverted V-shape 
14 
 
of the forecast rate in the US. The contrast of the Chinese vs. US patterns suggests that the 
Chinese forecast regulation overrides managers’ reluctance to supply information when 
uncertainty is high and, therefore, significantly increases the amount of forward-looking 
information available to investors. In addition, the average forecast rate in the US for earnings 
decreases of less than 50% is 29% and that for earnings increases of less than 50% is 38%. The 
comparison of these percentages with the Chinese forecast rates suggests that near the end of 
our sample period the voluntary forecast rate in China is comparable to the US rate over similar 
earnings-change regions. These results provide some preliminary evidence on the benefits of 
the Chinese forecast regulation—it encourages disclosure by otherwise unincentivized 
managers and potentially improves the transparency of the markets as a whole.   
Table 2 summarizes forecast frequency, venue, and form—forecast properties that are 
often discussed in the MEF literature. Panel A presents forecast frequency by firm-year and 
shows that 84% of the forecasting firms issue only one forecast in a given year. In contrast, 
only 14% of US forecasting firms forecast just once (untabulated). Panel B presents the 
frequency of forecasts issued in different venues—65% of mandatory forecasts and 28% of 
voluntary forecasts are standalone. We classify a forecast as standalone if there are no earnings 
announcements or actual earnings reports within three trading days of the forecast. In contrast, 
only 26% of US forecasts are standalone (untabulated). Panel C presents the frequency of 
different forecast forms. About half of mandatory forecasts are open-interval estimates, whereas 
point and range estimates account for 85% of voluntary forecasts. In contrast, 87% of US 
forecasts are range estimates and 10% are point estimates (untabulated). These contrasts 
indicate that forecast venue and form are similar for Chinese voluntary forecasts and US 
forecasts, but Chinese mandatory forecasts possess different features. 
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We next examine forecast timeliness, defined as the number of days between the fiscal 
year end and the forecast date. Forecast timeliness is a negative number if a forecast is issued 
after the fiscal year end. If a firm issues more than one forecast for a given year, we keep the 
initial forecast. Panel A of Figure 2 shows that Chinese mandatory forecasts cluster around two 
dates: the third-quarter report date and the forecast deadline. In contrast, Chinese voluntary 
forecasts occur throughout the year, with a cluster around the third-quarter report date and a 
large proportion (15%) issued 200 or more days before the fiscal year end. These patterns 
suggest that mandatory forecasts are on average less timely than voluntary forecasts, with a 
large proportion issued near the compliance deadline. Panel B shows forecast timeliness in the 
US and reveals little difference in the timeliness of forecasts issued by firms anticipating large 
vs. small earnings changes.   
4. The usefulness of mandatory forecasts  
4.1 Price reaction to mandatory forecasts 
We calculate CAR_MF, the firm’s cumulative market-adjusted stock return in the event 
window [-1, +1], where the mandatory-forecast date (“MF date”) is day 0, as the firm’s 
cumulative raw return minus the cumulative market return during the same window. We regress 
CAR_MF on MFnews, measured as the forecast minus prior-year earnings scaled by the market 
value of equity two days before the return window. This measure uses prior-year earnings as a 
proxy for earnings expectations. This proxy is reasonable because prior-earnings are an 
important benchmark, as confirmed by regulators’ basing a forecast rule on earnings changes. 
In supplementary analysis, we use the median of analyst earnings forecasts issued in the six 
months before the MF date as the benchmark and refer to the variable as MFnews_A. The 
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variable is missing for 55% of our test sample because analyst coverage is quite low in the early 
years of our sample period. We estimate Equation (1):  
.       (1) 
We estimate the regression using the robust-regression estimation method, which is 
robust to outliers and violation of the normality assumption in the error term (Anderson 2008). 
We report the results in Panel A of Table 3 using all mandatory forecasts as well as only 
standalone forecasts. To be consistent with the timeliness analysis, if a firm issues multiple 
forecasts for a given year, we keep the earliest one. However, we find similar results 
(untabulated) by restricting the sample to firm-years with only one forecast. For each sample, 
we first present the results when the forecast news is measured by MFnews_A. Its coefficient is 
significantly positive at 0.081 for the full sample and 0.144 for the standalone sample, 
suggesting that investors consider mandatory forecasts useful, rejecting the null of H1a. When 
we use MFnews instead, the coefficient remains significantly positive for both the full 
(coefficient = 0.050, z = 8.41) and standalone (coefficient =0.109, z = 15.79) samples, but the 
magnitude drops slightly from that for MFnews_A.  
We further separate the sample into good-news and bad-news mandatory forecasts 
based on the sign of MFnews and find a significantly larger coefficient for bad news than for 
good news using either all (z=3.67) or standalone (z=2.31) forecasts. This finding suggests that 
investors perceive bad-news mandatory forecasts to be more credible than good-news 
mandatory forecasts.  
4.2 Price reaction to subsequent earnings announcement or financial report 
If mandatory forecasts have information content, then the market would only react to 
the incremental news contained in the subsequent earnings announcement or financial report. 
eMFnewsaaMFCAR ++= 10_
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We use the earnings announcement date as the event date if the firm announced earnings before 
filing the financial report and use the filing date otherwise. For firm-years with mandatory 
forecasts, we calculate CAR_RP, the firm’s cumulative market-adjusted stock return in the 
event window [-1, +1], as its raw return minus the cumulative market return in this window. 
We regress CAR_RP on earnings surprise in Equation (2), where Surprise is a place holder for 
two alternative variables of earnings surprise: 
.       (2) 
In the first column of Panel B of Table 3, we consider the incremental news contained 
in the report as the surprise and measure Surprise1 as the difference between reported earnings 
and the previously disclosed forecast, scaled by the market value of equity two days before the 
return window. We find a positive and significant coefficient at 0.030 for Surprise1, suggesting 
that the market reacts to the incremental news. In the second column, we consider the total news 
contained in the report to be the surprise variable and measure Surprise2 as the difference 
between the reported and prior-year earnings, scaled by the market value of equity two days 
before the return window. The coefficient on Surprise2 is significantly positive, but the 
magnitude is smaller than that on Suprrise1. Total earnings news can be decomposed into 
forecasts news (MFnews) and incremental news (Surprise1). We interpret the smaller 
magnitude of the coefficient on total news as a consequence of MFnews adding noise to 
Surprise2, consistent with mandatory forecasts partially preempting earnings news in the report.  
As a reference, in the last column we estimate the same regression as in the second 
column but restrict the estimation to firm-years in the V-regime without any forecast. The 
coefficient on Surprise2 is significantly positive at 0.173 and can be viewed as the price reaction 
to earnings surprises for firms in the V-regime that provide no early earnings information. 
eSurprisebbRPCAR ++= 10_
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4.3 Analyst responses to mandatory forecasts 
We conduct two tests to examine whether financial analysts respond to mandatory 
forecasts. In the first test, we examine whether analysts issue or revise earnings forecasts right 
after firms provide mandatory forecasts. In US capital markets, the majority of analyst earnings 
forecasts during a year are issued within three trading days after earnings announcement events 
(Keskek, Tse, and Tucker 2014), suggesting that these events are especially informative. For 
our Chinese sample firms, we collect analyst forecasts of year t’s earnings issued within five 
calendar days after the earnings report dates for year t-1 and the fiscal quarters Q1-Q3 of year 
t. Panel C of Table 3 shows that the total number of analyst forecasts issued in these 5-day 
windows for firms that provide mandatory forecasts is 10,957, with 30.1% after the report date 
for year t-1, 38.0% after the semi-annual report date for year t, and 15.8% and 16.1% after the 
report dates for the first and third quarters of year t. A total of 2,158 analyst forecasts are issued 
within five days of the MF date, equivalent to 19.7% of the total number of analyst forecasts 
issued after the earnings report events, suggesting that analysts consider mandatory forecasts 
informative.   
In the second test, we examine the change in analyst forecast dispersion from the 180-
day window before the MF date to the 60-day window after this date, scaled by the absolute 
value of realized earnings. Panel D of Table 3 reports that the mean analyst forecast dispersion 
decreases from 0.388 in the pre-event window to 0.211 in the post-event window and the 
decrease is statistically significant. We follow the same procedure for the control group—firms 
in the V-regime that do not issue any earnings forecast—and assign the median forecast date 
(60 days before the fiscal year end) of the mandatory forecast group as a pseudo-event date. We 
find that the decrease in forecast dispersion for the mandatory forecast group is substantially 
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larger than that for the control group. These results suggest that mandatory forecasts reduce 
analysts’ uncertainty in forecasting earnings.  
5. The learning effect 
5.1 Treatment vs. benchmark groups 
The treatment group for testing the learning effect is the firm-years that provided 
mandatory forecasts in year t-1 and are in the V-regime in year t. The benchmark group is the 
firm-years that were in the V-regime in year t-1 but issued no forecast and are again in the V-
regime in year t. Panel A of Table 4 presents the number of benchmark and treatment firm-
years sorted by forecast behavior in year t-1. In the small-earnings-decrease category, the 
treatment group accounts for 28% of the observations and the benchmark group accounts for 
60%. In the small-earnings-increase category, the treatment group accounts for 24% and the 
benchmark group accounts for 62%. Thus, in each category the benchmark group has over twice 
as many observations as the treatment group. 
We compare the forecast rate and firm characteristics between the treatment and 
benchmark groups separately for the small earnings decrease and increase categories. Forecast 
is 1 if the firm issues a forecast in year t and 0 otherwise. The firm characteristics are measured 
at the beginning of year t. SOE is 1 if the firm is directly owned or ultimately controlled by the 
government and 0 otherwise. Total Assets are the firm’s total assets and Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Competition is measured by the sum of absolute changes in the sales 
rankings (the raw rankings are divided by the number of firms in the industry) from year t-2 to 
t-1 for all firms in the firm’s industry. Intense industry competition would lead to large changes 
in firms’ rankings from one year to the next. BM is the book-to-market ratio. StdROA is the 
standard deviation of accounting return on assets in the five years before year t. Analyst 
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coverage, Follow, is measured as the number of analysts who provided estimates of the firm’s 
year t-1 earnings. Institutional ownership, IO, is the percentage ownership by institutional 
investors. Regulate is 1 for mining, utilities, financial services, media, and transportation and 0 
otherwise. In addition, we construct Finance, which takes the value of 1 if the firm accesses the 
stock market in year t+1 and 0 otherwise. Appendix 3 summarizes the variable definitions.  
Panel B of Table 4 presents the mean values of dummy variables and the mean and 
median values (in parentheses) of the remaining variables. The forecast rate for the treatment 
group is 13.3% for small earnings decreases and 16.9% for small earnings increases. In contrast, 
the benchmark group’s forecasts rates are substantially lower at 4.0% for small earnings 
decreases and 5.4% for small earnings increases. Panel C presents pairwise Pearson 
correlations, none of which is high enough to warrant concerns of multicollinearity. 
The treatment and benchmark groups differ in most observable firm characteristics and 
these differences present challenges in drawing inferences from comparing the groups. To 
address this selection problem, for each treatment observation we use propensity score 
matching based on Equation (3) to identify a control observation from the benchmark group 
that has the closest propensity score:17  
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17 We distinguish treatment firms from benchmark firms, but do not further distinguish the four circumstances that 
lead a firm to the treatment group for two reasons. First, the most important distinction here is whether a firm has 
material earnings news, indicated by large earnings changes from the previous year and by entering or exiting the 
loss zone. The forecast regulation requires that firms anticipating material news provide such news well before the 
financial report date. Thus, regardless of the circumstances that lead a firm into the treatment group, treatment 
firms have one thing in common: they all have forced forecast experience in year t-1, which is the property of 
interest to us. Second, the sample size, especially for forecast quality analysis, would be substantially reduced if 
we further separate treatment firms by the four circumstances.  
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The first column in Table 5 presents the logit model estimation that generates the propensity 
score. We have 1,183 treatment-control matched pairs, which are similar on all dimensions as 
reported in the last three columns of the table.   
5.2 The likelihood of subsequent voluntary forecasts 
We use the matched pairs to examine whether treatment firms are more likely to issue 
voluntary forecasts in year t than are control firms. Because of the use of a matched sample, we 
estimate a conditional logit model in Equation (4), which allows a different intercept for each 
pair (Cram, Karan, and Stuart 2009). The dependent variable is Forecast. The explanatory 
variable is Treatment, and it takes the value of 1 for an observation in the treatment group and 
0 for the matched control observation:  
. (4) 
We control for SOE because SOE firms rely more heavily on government resources than 
the capital market for financing (Chen, Chen, Lobo, and Wang 2011; He, Wong, and Young 
2012). We expect SOEs’ limited need for external public financing to reduce their incentives 
to provide voluntary disclosure (Firth, Wang, Wong 2015). The other control variables are 
identified in the US literature (e.g., Kasznik and Lev 1995; Tucker 2007; Li 2010). Size captures 
reputational costs in China; Competition proxies for proprietary disclosure costs; BM captures 
the firm’s growth prospects; StdROA reflects the supply of or demand for earnings predictions 
when earnings are uncertain; Follow proxies for the information demand from financial 
analysts; IO captures the information demand from institutional investors; Regulate reflects 
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different information environments of firms in the regulated industries; and Finance reflects 
the firm’s incentive for being transparent before planned funding.18  
Table 6 reports the estimation results. The coefficient on Treatment for forecasting small 
earnings decreases is 2.826 with a z-statistic of 7.86 and that for forecasting small earnings 
increases is 2.664 with a z-statistic of 8.34. These results indicate that the forced forecast 
experience makes these firms more likely to issue forecasts voluntarily in the subsequent year, 
consistent with the learning effect. These associations could be due to treatment firms’ 
commitment to issuing voluntary forecasts if they have done so in the past. To address this 
concern, we eliminate treatment-control pairs where the treatment firm issued voluntary 
forecasts in year t-2 or, for a stricter test, in any sample year before year t. Our primary finding 
holds (untabulated).   
5.3 The properties of subsequent voluntary forecasts 
The learning effect predicts that the forced forecast experience increases the quality of 
voluntary forecasts. We consider forecast timeliness, precision, and accuracy as indicators of 
quality. Timeliness is measured by the number of days between the fiscal year end and the 
forecast date. Precision is 0 for qualitative, 1 for open-interval, 2 for range, and 3 for point 
forecasts. Error is the absolute difference between the forecast and reported earnings, scaled by 
the absolute value of the realization. We use the midpoint of a range forecast and the stated 
number of an open-interval forecast in the calculation and set the value as missing for qualitative 
forecasts. Table 4 presents the mean and median values of Timeliness, Precision, and Error 
separately for the treatment and benchmark groups for the small earnings decrease and increase 
                                                 
18 Analyst coverage has grown substantially from 40% in the first year to 91% in the last year of our sample. We 
control for analyst coverage in all our analyses of the managerial learning effect.  
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categories. Note that these three variables are available for the subsets of treatment and 
benchmark groups that issue voluntary forecasts in year t and, as a result, some of the original 
1,183 treatment-control matched pairs identified in Table 5 are lost.  
We use two approaches to select treatment-control pairs for forecast quality analyses. 
Under the first approach we retain observations in the original 1,183 pairs only if both the 
treatment and control firms issue voluntary forecasts in year t, and we are left with a sample of 
only 37 pairs. Given the small sample size, we pool the earnings decrease and increase 
categories and estimate Equation (5) for forecast timeliness:  
                  (5) 
We control for firm characteristics in the regression in case the pairs are not perfect matches.  
Under the second approach we retain the treatment observations that issue voluntary 
forecasts in year t, return to the original pool of 3,784 benchmark observations, and select from 
the forecasting benchmark observations the one with the closest propensity score to each 
forecasting treatment observation. We obtain 53 pairs with available data for the small earnings 
decrease analysis and 92 pairs for the small earnings increase analysis. We prefer this approach 
because it yields a much larger sample. 
Table 7 reports the robust-regression estimation results. Under the first approach, the 
coefficient on Treatment is 48.144 and is significantly positive, suggesting that the forced 
forecast experience increases forecast timeliness of subsequent voluntary forecasts by 48 days 
on average. Under the second approach, the coefficient is significantly positive at 30.253 for 
small earnings decreases and 53.296 for small earnings increases. These results are robust to 
excluding treatment-control pairs if the treatment firm issued a voluntary forecast in year t-2.  
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In untabulated analysis we examine whether forced forecast experience increases the 
precision of subsequent voluntary forecasts and find little evidence. In Table 8, we replace 
Timeliness in Equation (5) with Error and add Timeliness as a control variable (e.g., forecasts 
with a longer horizon are expected to be less accurate). The coefficient on Treatment is not 
significantly different from zero in any model. Thus, we find no effect of forced forecast 
experience on the precision and accuracy of subsequent voluntary forecasts.   
Figure 3 plots the voluntary forecast rate for the full sample. The forecast rates started 
from almost nil in 2004 and gradually increased in the next four years. After that, the voluntary 
forecast rates for small earnings decreases and increases continue to trend upward, with a higher 
pace for forecasts of small earnings increases. The upward trends are consistent with the 
learning effect as well as increased demand for disclosure from the steadily increasing coverage 
of financial analysts and institutional ownership. Because we control for analyst coverage and 
institutional ownership in the regression, we conclude that the learning effect contributes to the 
upward trends of voluntary forecasts.   
5.4 SOE vs. non-SOE firms 
A notable feature of Chinese economy is governmental ownership. SOEs may behave 
differently from non-SOEs because SOEs rely more on governmental resources than the capital 
market. We classify firms as SOEs or non-SOEs using data from CSMAR, which lists the 
controlling shareholder as well as the actual controller (calculated by the equity control chain).19 
Panel A of Table 9 provides the descriptive statistics for SOE vs. non-SOE observations within 
                                                 
19 We use the China Center for Economic Research (CCER) database from Peking University as an alternative 
data source to classify SOEs. CCER identifies a firm as an SOE based on the ultimate controller of the largest 
shareholder and whether the ultimate controller is owned by state entities or SOEs. We find similar results using 
this alternative classification.  
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each category that is reported earlier in Panel B of Table 4. In each category, non-SOEs have a 
higher voluntary forecast rate than SOEs. We modify the propensity score matching procedure 
so that a control observation for an SOE (non-SOE) treatment observation is the SOE (non-
SOE) firm in the benchmark group with the closet propensity score. Using these matched 
treatment and control observations, we re-estimate Equation (4) separately for SOEs and non-
SOEs. Panel B reports that for both SOEs and non-SOEs, treatment firms are more likely to 
provide voluntary forecasts than control firms. In untabulated tests we find no differences 
between the Treatment coefficients for SOEs and non-SOEs. In Panel C, however, when we re-
estimate Equation (5), we find that the coefficient on Treatment is only significantly positive 
for non-SOEs. This contrast suggests a larger learning effect for non-SOEs than for SOEs.20  
6. Insider trading 
We collect insider trading data from the CSMAR database, which classifies company 
executives and directors as insiders and has coverage from 2007. In the first analysis, we collect 
a firm’s aggregate shares traded by insiders in sale and purchase transactions as percentages of 
total shares outstanding in the 30 days before vs. after the mandatory-forecast date. We define 
a pseudo-event date for the control group (i.e., firms in the V-regime that do not provide any 
forecast) to be the median date of mandatory forecasts by the treatment group (i.e., firms that 
provide mandatory forecasts). We examine good news and bad news firms separately.  
Table 10 reports that there are purchase or sales transactions among fewer than 2% of 
the firms in both the mandatory-forecast and control firm groups for either good news or bad 
news. The exception is sales transactions for good news in mandatory-forecast firms, which 
                                                 
20 In untabulated analysis we find no difference between SOEs controlled by the central government vs. SOEs 
controlled by local governments. We also find no differential market reaction to mandatory forecasts issued by 
SOEs vs. non-SOEs.   
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occur for 3.8% of those firms. The proportion of mandatory-forecast firms with pre-forecast 
sales transactions related to good news is substantially smaller by 2.4%, suggesting that 
managers delay their sales transactions until after the firm announces mandatory good-news 
forecasts. The nonparametric test results for bad news firms suggest that managers of mandatory 
forecast firms also tend to delay sales transactions until after the forecast date, but the economic 
magnitude of this delay is rather small. Given the low frequency of insider transactions around 
management earnings forecast events and the tendency of managers to delay sales until after 
both good- and bad-news forecasts, we conclude that insiders do not exploit their information 
advantage related to mandatory forecasts (e.g., the timely information that managers learn by 
formulating mandatory forecasts) to trade at the expense of outside shareholders.  
In untabulated analysis, we separately examine insider trading patterns for SOEs and 
non-SOEs and find a significantly higher proportion of non-SOEs with insider trades relative 
to SOEs. This finding is consistent with that in Lu et al. (2017) that managers of SOEs trade 
less than non-SOE managers around management earnings forecasts. We also find that SOE 
managers own substantially fewer shares than non-SOE managers, on average, and this 
difference might explain observed less insider trading by SOE managers. Our finding could 
also be explained by different incentives SOE and non-SOE managers face: SOE managers are 
often motived by future promotions, whereas non-SEO managers are more likely to be 
motivated by monetary benefits.  
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7. The earnings management effect  
We follow Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and present graphical evidence of the 
discontinuity at 50% in the earnings change distribution.21 Panel A of Figure 4 presents the 
distributional graph for 1999-2000 and Panel B shows the graph for 2002-2003. The width of 
each bin is 0.05, or 5% of earnings. The bin marked as “-0.50” includes firms with earnings 
change percentages between -55% (exclusive) and -50% (inclusive). The bin marked as “-0.45” 
includes firms with earnings change percentages between -50% (exclusive) and -45% 
(inclusive). There is no noticeable discontinuity at either -50% or +50% for 1999-2000, but a 
clear discontinuity at -50% for 2002-2003, suggesting that some firms manipulate earnings to 
avoid the 50% earnings-decrease threshold for mandatory forecasts.  
Table 11 presents our formal statistical tests of discontinuity. Under the null hypothesis 
of no earnings manipulation, we expect the number of observations in adjacent bins to change 
at a constant rate (i.e., smoothness). Following the method specified in Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997), we calculate the difference between the actual number of observations and the predicted 
number, assuming smoothness. The standardized difference has a standard normal distribution. 
This statistic is -4.24, significant at the 1% level, for the bin of “-0.50” for 2002-2003, indicating 
that unexpectedly few firms report earnings decreases of 50% or worse. The corresponding 
statistic for the bin of “-0.45” is 3.93, also significant, corroborating the statistic to the left of 
the threshold. In contrast, none of the test statistics for 1999-2000 are statistically significant, 
suggesting that earnings manipulations to avoid the -50% threshold are associated with the 
                                                 
21 We do not examine whether firms manipulate earnings to avoid forecasting losses because the event year is 
unclear. Although the stock exchanges imposed the loss threshold for mandatory forecasts in December 2000, the 
CSRC enacted a relatively vague rule for forecasting losses in December 1998. Moreover, firms may avoid 
reporting losses for reasons unrelated to earnings forecasts (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and 
Zeckhauser 1999).  
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forecast mandate. We find no evidence of manipulations to avoid the +50% threshold, perhaps 
because managers could have incentives to disclose good news even without a mandate. The 
asymmetric earnings management behavior could also be an indication that managers are more 
likely to cover up missing a bad-news forecast than a good-news forecast, as failing to forecast 
bad news is more likely to be sanctioned by regulators. Overall, we find evidence of earnings 
management around the 50% earnings-decrease mandatory-forecast threshold.  
8. Conclusion 
To function well, any capital market must effectively address information problems that 
arise in the market. Increasing corporate disclosure between regulatory filing dates, such as 
through MEF, is an important step in reducing information problems. Whether the visible hand 
(regulation) or the invisible hand (market forces) results in a cost-beneficial mechanism for 
increasing managers’ propensity to provide quality earnings forecasts has been an issue of 
enduring interest to financial theorists and empiricists. Our study examines a novel idea—the 
visible hand for some firms and the invisible hand for the others. We use the Chinese setting to 
examine this idea because China is the only country so far that has adopted this mixed approach.   
We find four economic effects of the mixed approach toward MEF. First, investors and 
financial analysts react to mandatory forecasts as if they are informative. Thus, the forecast 
mandate expedites the disclosure of material corporate information to investors by at least three 
months—the interval between the forecast deadline and the annual financial report deadline. 
Second, mandatory forecasts seem to stimulate subsequent-period voluntary forecasts, perhaps 
through managerial learning: managers become familiar with the forecasting and disclosing 
procedures through forced forecast experience. Third, even though Chinese regulators were 
concerned about insiders’ taking advantage of their information advantage absent mandatory 
29 
 
forecasts, we do not find strong evidence that insider trading behavior changes around 
mandatory forecasts. Last, some managers appear to manipulate reported earnings to avoid the 
threshold of 50% earnings decreases stipulated in the forecast regulation.  
Our study provides evidence of the pros and cons of a novel approach toward regulating 
MEF. We provide feedback on one of the most important disclosure regulations in China. The 
evidence might be useful to regulators, managers, and investors in other economies, especially 
other emerging markets.     
30 
 
References 
Admati, A. R. and P. Pfleiderer. 2000. Forcing firms to talk: Financial disclosure regulation and 
externalities. Review of Financial Studies 13(3): 479-519.  
Anderson, R. 2008. Modern methods for robust regression. SAGE Publications.  
Beyer, A., Cohen, D., Lys T., and B. Walther. 2010. The financial reporting environment: Review of 
the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50: 296-343.  
Bloomberg. 2014. China overtakes Japan as world’s second biggest stock market. Bloomberg News. 
November 27.  
Burgstahler, D. and I. Dichev. 1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 24: 99-126. 
Burton, J.  C. 1974. Forecasts: A changing view from the Securities and Exchange Commission in public 
reporting of corporate financial forecasts, edited by P. Prakash and A. Rappaport. New York: 
Commerce Clearing House.  
Carpenter, J. N., F. Lu, and R. F. Whitelaw. 2015. The real value of China’s stock market. No. w20957. 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper.  
Chen, H., J. Z. Chen, G. J. Lobo, and Y. Wang. 2011. Effects of audit quality on earnings management 
and cost of equity capital: Evidence from China. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (3): 
892-925.  
Cram, D. P., V. Karan, and I. Stuart. 2009. Three threats to validity of choice-based and matched-sample 
studies in accounting research. Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (2): 477-516. 
Daily, R. A. 1971. The feasibility of reporting forecasted information. The Accounting Review 46 (4): 
686-692.  
Degeorge, F., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser. 1999. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of 
Business 72 (1): 1-33. 
Du, Z., F. Tang, and W. S. Zhang. 2014. Aggregate accounting earnings and security returns: China 
evidence and the replication of US results. China Accounting and Finance Review 16 (2): 107-
127.  
Dye, R. A. 1985. Disclosure of nonproprietary information. Journal of Accounting Research 23 (1): 
123–145. 
Dye, R. A. 1990. Mandatory vs. voluntary disclosures: The case of financial and real externalities. The 
Accounting Review 65(1): 1-24.  
Firth, M., K. Wang, and S. Wong. 2015. Corporate transparency and the impact of investor sentiment 
on stock prices. Management Science 61(7): 1630-1647. 
Gonedes, N. J., N. Dopuch, and S. H. Penman. 1976. Disclosure rules, information-production, and 
capital market equilibrium: The case of forecast disclosure rules. Journal of Accounting 
Research 14 (1): 89-137. 
Grossman, S.  J. 1981. The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. 
Journal of Law and Economics 24 (3): 461-483.   
Gu, Z., Z. Li, and Y. G. Yang. 2013. Monitors or predators: The influence of institutional investors on 
sell-side analysts. The Accounting Review 88 (1): 137-169. 
Guo, N. and H. Qi. 2010. Empirical evidence of management forecasts and earnings management: 
Evidence from China. Research of Economics and Management 2: 81-88. In Chinese. 
He, X., T. J. Wong, and D. Young. 2012. Challenges for implementation of fair value accounting in 
emerging markets: Evidence from China. Contemporary Accounting Research 29 (2): 538-562.  
Hirshleifer, J. 1971. The private and social value of information and the reward to incentive activity. 
American Economic Review 61 (4): 561-574.  
Hong, S. 2016. Chinese firms rush to raise equity. Wall Street Journal. December 9. Section B12.  
Huang, Y. and X. Li. 2014. Information content of annual earnings announcements: A comparative 
study. China Accounting and Finance Review 16 (2): 171-182.  
31 
 
Jiang, Y., X. Tong, and X. Yang. 2003. Information content of earnings warnings. China Accounting 
and Finance Review 5 (4): 164-183. In Chinese. 
Kasznik R. and B. Lev. 1995. To warn or not to warn: Management disclosures in the face of an earnings 
surprise. The Accounting Review 70 (1): 113-134.  
Kato, K., D. J. Skinner, and M. Kunimura. 2009. Management forecasts in Japan: An empirical study 
of forecasts that are effectively mandated. The Accounting Review 84 (5): 1575-1606.  
Keskek, S. S. Tse, and J. W. Tucker. 2014. Analyst information production and the timing of annual 
earnings forecasts. Review of Accounting Studies 19 (4): 1504-1531.   
Li, X. 2010. The impacts of product market competition on the quantity and quality of voluntary 
disclosures. Review of Accounting Studies 15: 663-711. 
Liu, Q. 2006. Corporate governance in China: Current practices, economic effects and institutional 
determinants. CESifo Economic Studies 52 (2): 415-453. 
Lu G., Zhang J., and Liu B. 2017. Do Voluntary Positive Earnings Forecasts of Chinese Listed 
Companies Benefit Public or Private Interests? Empirical Evidence Based on the Major 
Shareholders’ Selling of Non-tradable Shares. Nankai Business Review 20(2): 133-143. In 
Chinese. 
McDonald, C. L. 1973. An empirical examination of the reliability of published predictions of future 
earnings. The Accounting Review 48 (3): 502-510.  
Pan, X. and T. Wu. 2011. Credibility crisis of brokerage research reports: The five problems. Securities 
Daily (May 11). In Chinese. 
Patell, J. M. 1976. Corporate forecasts of earnings per share and stock price behavior: Empirical test. 
Journal of Accounting Research 14 (2): 246-276.  
Penman. S. H. 1980. An empirical investigation of the voluntary disclosure of corporate earnings 
forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 18 (1): 132-160. 
Qin, Y. 2004. The decline of voluntary earnings forecasts by IPO firms. Accounting Research 11: 76-
80. In Chinese. 
Pownall, G. and G. Waymire. 1989. Voluntary disclosure credibility and securities prices: Evidence 
from management earnings forecasts, 1967-73. Journal of Accounting Research 27 (2): 227-
245.  
Shroff, N. 2017. Corporate investment and changes in GAAP. Review of Accounting Studies 22: 1-63. 
Song, Y. 2009. Selection bias in CSRC’s sanction for management forecast violations. Qinghua 
University Publication 24: 52-60. In Chinese. 
Song, Y, Z., Li, and X. Ji. 2011. The consequences of sanctions for management forecast violations. 
Financial Research 6: 136-149. In Chinese. 
Strumpf, D. and C. Driebusch. 2015. China jitters set the tone for U.S. stocks. Wall Street Journal. 
August 14, 2015.  
Till, K. 1980. The SEC safe harbor for forecasts: A step in the right direction? Duke Law Journal 1980 
(3): 607-640.  
Tucker, J. W. 2007. Is openness penalized?  Stock returns around earnings warnings. The Accounting 
Review 82 (4): 1055-1087.  
Xue, S. 2001. Information content of loss pre-announcements. China Accounting and Finance Review 
3(3): 144-176.  
Verrecchia, R. E. 1983. Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5, 179-194. 
Waymire, G. 1984. Additional evidence on the information content of management earnings forecasts. 
Journal of Accounting Research 22 (2): 703-718. 
Waymire, G. 1985. Earnings volatility and voluntary management earnings disclosure. Journal of 
Accounting Research 23 (1): 268-295.  
 
  
32 
 
FIGURE 1 
Percentage of Firms Issuing Management Forecasts of Annual Earnings 
 
Panel A: Chinese firms 
 
 
 
Panel B: US firms 
 
 
 
Note: In Panel A we plot the percentage of Chinese firms publicly listed during 2004-2011 that issued 
forecasts of annual earnings for intervals of proportionate earnings change from the previous year. In 
Panel B we do the same for US publicly listed firms over the same sample period.  
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FIGURE 2 
Forecast Timeliness 
 
Panel A: Chinese forecasts  
Mandatory forecast regime          Voluntary forecast regime     
      
 
Panel B: US forecasts  
Earnings regions of Chinese mandatory regime    Earnings regions of Chinese voluntary regime 
  
 
Note: Timeliness is the number of days between the fiscal year end date and the forecast date. A higher 
value indicates a more timely forecast. Note that timeliness increases from left to right on the horizontal 
axis, so the earliest forecasts are at the right end of the scale. The bars at the end of the spectrum are 
observations beyond the end of the x-axis. In Panel A we plot the timeliness of forecasts issued by Chinese 
publicly listed firms during 2004-2011. In Panel B we plot the timeliness of forecasts issued by US publicly 
listed firms during the same period. The Chinese mandatory regime comprises firms that anticipate an 
earnings decrease or increase from the previous year of at least 50%, a loss, or a profit after reporting a loss 
in the previous year; the rest belong to the Chinese voluntary regime.  
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FIGURE 3 
Trends of Voluntary Forecast Rate 
 
 
 
 
Note: Chinese firms are required to forecast an earnings decrease from the previous year of at least 50%, a 
loss, a profit after reporting a loss in the previous year, and an earnings increase of at least 50%. Forecasts 
in other situations are voluntary and these situations are referred to as “Small Decrease” and “Small 
Increase.” Forecast rate is the percentage of firms in a given category that provide forecasts as tabulated in 
Table 1.  
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FIGURE 4 
Distribution of Chinese Firms Reporting Earnings Changes 
 
Panel A: Before the forecast mandate regarding earnings changes (1999-2000) 
 
  
 
Panel B: After the forecast mandate regarding earnings changes (2002-2003) 
 
 
 
Note: The requirement that firms issue forecasts for earnings changes of at least 50% in magnitude took 
effect in December 2001. The x-axis is the proportionate earnings change from the previous year. The y-
axis is the number of firm-years. The “50% decrease” line goes through the data point of earnings change 
between -0.55 (excluded) and -0.50 (included). The “50% increase” line goes through the data point of 
earnings change between 0.45 (included) and 0.50 (excluded). 
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APPENDIX 1 
Example of Chinese Management Earnings Forecast 
 
 
 
Stock code: 600132                          Ticker: ChongqingBeer           Public Release# 2011-002 
 
 
Chongqing Beer Incorporated 
2010 Earnings Forecast Release 
 
 
Our company and the board of directors guarantee the truthfulness, accuracy, and completeness of 
the content in this release and are responsible for any errors, omissions, or misleading statements. 
 
 
1. Forecast 
(1) Forecasting period: 1/1/2010 to 12/31/2010. 
(2) Content: Based on our preliminary estimates, we anticipate the net income for 2010 to be higher 
than that for the previous year by 50% or more.  
(3) This forecast is not audited by CPAs. 
 
2. Earnings reported for the previous year (1/1/2009 to 12/31/2009) 
(1) Net income: RMB 181,478,933.93. 
(2) EPS: RMB 0.37.  
 
3. Explanation 
The company has made a profit from selling land in Yuanshiqiaopu factory district in 2010. The sale 
is based on the decision made at the company’s second shareholder meeting in 2009 (Release #2009-
026). Under this decision, the company transfers the ownership of the land to Chongqing Yufu Asset 
Management Corporation at the sale price of RMB 250 million. The company received the first 
instalment of RMB 130 million in March 2010. 
 
4. Other 
Please see the details of our operating results in our forthcoming financial report for 2010. We would 
like to remind investors of investment risks.  
 
End of the release. 
 
 
Chongqing Beer Incorporated  
Board of Directors  
January 28, 2011  
 
 
 
Note: The release is translated from Chinese by the authors of this paper. The standard language in the 
management earnings forecast release form (provided by the exchanges) is in italics. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Chinese Management Earnings Forecast Regimes 
 
 
  
 Loss? 
Ex post Earnings 
Yes 
No  Loss in 
previous year? 
No  Earnings change 
from previous year by 
at least 50%? 
No 
Yes Yes 
Loss Firm Turning-profit Firm Large-earnings-decrease Firm 
Large-earnings-
increase Firm 
Small-earnings-
increase Firm 
Small-earnings-
decrease Firm 
Voluntary 
Regime 
Mandatory 
Regime 
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APPENDIX 3 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variables used in the tests of market reaction  
CAR_MF = reaction to mandatory earnings forecast. It is the three-trading-day, [-1, +1], 
market-adjusted stock return around the forecast date. 
MFnews = mandatory earnings forecast news. It is the difference between the forecast for 
year t and the reported earnings for year t-1, scaled by the market value of equity 
two days before the forecast date.  
CAR_RP = reaction to financial report. It is the three-trading-day, [-1, +1], market-adjusted 
stock return around the earlier date of earnings announcement or financial report 
(referred to as the “report date”). 
Surprise1 = remaining news. It is the difference between the reported earnings for year t and 
the mandatory earnings forecast for year t, scaled by the market value of equity two 
days before the report date.  
Surprise2 = total news. It is the difference between the reported earnings for year t and the 
reported earnings for year t-1, scaled by the market value of equity two days before 
the report date. 
  
Variables used in the tests of the learning effect 
Treatment  = 1 if the firm issued a mandatory earnings forecast in year t-1 and is in the 
voluntary regime in year t (“treatment group”) and 0 if the firm was in the 
voluntary regime in year t-1 and did not any forecast and is in the voluntary regime 
again in year t (“benchmark group”).   
Forecast = 1 if the firm issues a voluntary management forecast in year t and 0 otherwise. 
Timeliness = the number of days between the fiscal year end date and the voluntary 
management forecast date. The higher the number, the more timely the forecast. 
Precision = 0 for qualitative, 1 for open-interval, 2 for range, and 3 for point forecasts.  
Error = the absolute difference between the voluntary management forecast and earnings 
realization, scaled by the absolute value of the realization. 
SOE = 1 if the firm is directly owned or ultimately controlled by the government at the 
beginning of year t and 0 otherwise. 
Size = the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets (in millions of RMB) at the 
beginning of year t. 
Competition = the sum of absolute changes in the sales ranking (each raw ranking in the 
industry is divided by the number of firms in the industry) from year t-2 to t-1 for 
all firms in the industry.   
BM = the book-to-market ratio of the firm at the beginning of year t. 
StdROA = the standard deviation of the firm’s accounting return on assets during years t-5 
to t-1. 
Follow = the number of financial analysts following the firm in year t-1. 
IO = the number of shares owned by institutional investors as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding at the beginning of year t. 
Regulate = 1 if the firm is in a regulated industry and 0 otherwise. The regulated industries in 
China are mining, electricity/water/gas, financial services, media, and 
transportation.   
Finance = 1 if the firm issues equity in year t+1 and 0 otherwise. 
Note: We use the point forecast, the midpoint of a range forecast, or the stated number of an open-interval 
estimate in calculating MFnews, Surprise1, and Error. 
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TABLE 1 
Management Earnings Forecast Regimes 
 
Panel A: Firms in the mandatory forecast regime 
Year   Large earnings decrease   Loss   Turning profit   Large earnings increase   Total 
    CF ICF NF CF%  CF ICF NF CF%  CF ICF NF CF%  CF ICF NF CF%   
2004  44 2 15 72%  153 12 8 88%  84 2 8 89%  124 0 44 74%  496 
2005  83 0 13 86%  242 16 8 91%  67 1 5 92%  97 3 18 82%  553 
2006  35 2 19 63%  157 10 12 88%  150 7 11 89%  171 2 43 79%  619 
2007  25 3 13 61%  110 2 8 92%  126 10 5 89%  344 6 46 87%  698 
2008  198 9 21 87%  238 15 8 91%  60 3 4 90%  152 4 29 82%  741 
2009  90 6 16 80%  183 15 5 90%  161 13 6 89%  243 8 35 85%  781 
2010  60 1 12 82%  104 9 9 85%  147 12 8 88%  322 2 33 90%  719 
2011  148 17 8 86%  149 7 3 94%  73 4 2 92%  259 29 11 87%  710 
Total  683 40 117 81%  1,336 86 61 90%  868 52 49 90%  1,712 54 259 85%  5,317 
 
Panel B: Firms in the voluntary forecast regime 
  Small earnings decrease  Small earnings increase   Total 
Year F NF F%  F NF F%     
2004 5 270 2%  8 349 2%  632 
2005 2 298 1%  3 375 1%  678 
2006 7 190 4%  20 367 5%  584 
2007 20 136 13%  44 313 12%  513 
2008 74 271 21%  71 240 23%  656 
2009 58 195 23%  130 254 34%  637 
2010 46 191 19%  136 383 26%  756 
2011 183 291 39%  355 391 48%  1,220 
Total 395 1,842 18%  767 2,672 22%  5,676 
Note: The sample includes Chinese firms with A shares listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange that have non-missing total assets, stock price, and net 
income. We determine the mandatory and voluntary regimes (M-regime and V-regime) by reported earnings. Chinese firms are required to issue a forecast if they 
expect an earnings decrease from the previous year of at least 50%, a loss, a profit after reporting a loss in the previous year (turning profit), or an earnings increase 
of at least 50%. In Panel A, CF (consistent forecast) means that a firm issued a forecast under one of the four anticipated situations consistent with the subsequently 
reported earnings. CF is referred to as “mandatory forecast” in the text, figures, and other tables. ICF (inconsistent forecast) means that a firm belongs to an M-
regime category according to reported earnings, but issued a forecast for a different M-regime category or a V-regime category. NF means that no forecast is issued. 
CF% is the percentage of CF firms in a given category. In Panel B, F means forecasting firms and F% is the percentage of F firms in a given category.  
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TABLE 2 
Frequency, Venues, and Forms of Management Earnings Forecasts 
 
 Panel A: Firm-years with single vs. multiple forecasts  
  Mandatory-forecast firm-years    Voluntary-forecast firm-years   
 
Large earnings 
decrease Loss 
Turning 
profit 
Large earnings 
increase Subtotal  
Small earnings 
decrease 
Small earnings 
increase Subtotal 
 Total 
firm-years 
Single 614 984 762 1477 3,837  328 688 1,016  4,853 
 (90%) (74%) (88%) (86%) (83%)  (83%) (90%) (87%)  (84%) 
Multiple 69 352 106 235 762  67 79 146  908 
Total firm-years 683 1,336 868 1,712 4,599  395 767 1,162  5,761 
 
Panel B: Forecasts sorted by forecast venue  
 Mandatory forecasts  Voluntary forecasts   
 
Large earnings 
decrease Loss 
Turning 
profit 
Large earnings 
increase Subtotal  
Small earnings 
decrease 
Small earnings 
increase Subtotal  
Total 
forecasts 
Standalone  533 1,147 633 1,215 3,528  148 222 370  3,898 
 (71%) (64%) (65%) (62%) (65%)  (32%) (26%) (28%)  (58%) 
At interim earnings ann. 0 3 0 3 6  2 1 3  9 
At interim earnings report 220 635 347 732 1,934   315 627 942   2,876 
Total forecasts 753 1,785 980 1,950 5,468  465 850 1,315   6,783 
 
Panel C: Forecasts sorted by forecast form  
  Mandatory forecasts   Voluntary forecasts     
  Large decrease Loss Turning profit Large increase   Small decrease Small increase   Total forecasts 
Point 105 (15%) 335 (25%) 168 (19%) 194 (11%)  62 (16%) 126 (16%)  990 (17%) 
Range 259 (38%) 234 (18%) 184 (21%) 765 (45%)  269 (68%) 516 (67%)  2,227 (39%) 
Open Interval 319 (47%) 767 (57%) 516 (60%) 753 (44%)  58 (14%) 115 (16%)  2,528 (44%) 
Qualitative      6 (2%) 10 (1%)  16 (0%) 
Total forecasts 683 (100%) 1,336 (100%) 868 (100%) 1,712 (100%)  395 (100%) 767 (100%)  5,761 (100%) 
Note: “Interim earnings ann.” (“Interim earnings report”) means that a forecast is issued at the earnings announcement (financial report filing) event 
for year t-1 or the first three fiscal quarters of year t. In Panel A, we report the percentage of single-forecast firm-years among total firm-years in 
parentheses.  In Panel B, we report the percentage of standalone forecasts among total forecasts in parentheses. We classify a forecast standalone if 
there are no earnings announcements or actual earnings reports within three trading days of the forecast.
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TABLE 3 
Perceived Usefulness of Mandatory Earnings Forecasts 
 
Panel A: Price reaction to mandatory earnings forecasts 
 
 All forecasts  Standalone forecasts 
 Total Good news Bad news  Total Good news Bad news 
Intercept 0.005*** -0.005*** 0.009*** -0.019***  0.013*** 0.001 0.016*** -0.018*** 
 (3.93) (-5.22) (5.88) (-8.60)  (7.53) (0.591) (8.64) (-6.90) 
MFnews  0.050*** -0.015* 0.045**   0.109*** 0.030*** 0.072*** 
  (8.41) (-1.96) (2.56)   (15.79) (3.14) (4.57) 
MFnews_A 0.081***     0.144***    
 (4.61)     (6.57)    
Model F 21.21*** 70.8*** 3.85*** 6.54**  43.23*** 249.36*** 9.83*** 20.88*** 
N 2,013 4,510 2,797 1,713  1,438 3,213 1,932 1,281 
 
 
Panel B: Price reaction to the earlier date of earnings announcement or financial report  
 
 Firms with mandatory forecasts 
 V-regime firms with no 
forecast 
 Surprise = remaining news  Surprise = total news  Surprise = total news 
Intercept -0.006***  -0.007***  -0.005*** 
 (-5.45)  (-6.70)  (-6.85) 
Surprise1 0.030***     
 (4.46)     
Surprise2   0.010**  0.173*** 
   (2.25)  (5.62) 
Model F 19.88***  5.06***  31.59*** 
N 4,312  4,312  4,393 
 
  
eMFnewsaaMFCAR ++= 10_
eSurpriseccRPCAR ++= 10_
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Panel C: Responsiveness (within five days) of financial analysts to mandatory earnings forecasts 
 
 Mandatory forecast group (4,127)  Control group (3,652) 
Report date # analyst forecasts % analyst forecasts  # analyst forecasts % analyst forecasts 
Year t-1  3,294 30.1%  6,044 31.8% 
Q1 of Year t 1,735 15.8%  2,874 15.1% 
Q2 of Year t 4,162 38.0%  6,012 31.7% 
Q3 of Year t 1,766 16.1%  4,054 21.4% 
Total 10,957 100%  18,984 100% 
      
MF date 2,158 19.7% of 10,957    
 
 
Panel D: Change in analyst forecast dispersion after mandatory earnings forecasts 
 
 
Mandatory forecast 
group (677) 
Control group 
(984) 
Between-group 
difference 
180 days before MF date:    
Mean 0.388 0.206  
Median 0.130 0.116  
    
60 days after MF date:    
Mean  0.211 0.129  
Median 0.067 0.062  
    
Change from pre to post:     
Mean (t-stat) -0.176 *** -0.077 *** 0.099 (3.02) 
Median (z-stat) -0.063 *** -0.054 *** 0.009 (2.74) 
 
Note: For Panels A and B, we use the first forecast if a firm issues multiple forecasts in a year. See Appendix 
3 for variable definitions. MFnews_A is similar to MFnews except for using analysts’ median earnings 
forecasts in the six months before the mandatory-forecast date (“MF date”) as the earnings expectation. The 
“Good news” column uses observations with non-negative values of MFnews. The “Bad news” column 
uses observations with negative values of MFnews. The coefficient on MFnews in the “Bad news” column 
is significantly higher than that in the “Good news” column, with z-statistic of 3.67 for total forecasts and 
2.31 for standalone forecasts (untabulated). We use the robust-regression estimation method, which is 
robust to outliers, to estimate the regressions. The standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. We report 
z–statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel C reports the frequency of analyst forecasts for year t’s earnings issued within five days after a 
corporate disclosure event. Panel D reports the dispersion of analyst forecasts for a firm-year’s earnings 
issued in the 180 days before the MF date vs. 60 days after it (including the MF date), each scaled by the 
absolute value of realized earnings. For firms that are in the V-regime and do not provide any forecast 
(“control group”), we use the median mandatory-forecast date of 60 days before the fiscal year end by the 
mandatory forecast group as a pseudo-event date. The final column compares the change in analyst forecast 
dispersion between the mandatory forecast group and the control group, with the t or z statistic reported in 
parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
TABLE 4 
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Descriptive Statistics of the Test Sample for the Learning Effect 
 
Panel A: Year t V-regime firms partitioned by Year t-1 forecast regime and behavior  
 
   V-regime in year t 
Year t-1  Small Decrease Small Increase 
M-regime 
Forecasted  (treatment group)  520 (28%) 664 (24%) 
Did not Forecast  (rule breakers)  100 (5%) 125 (5%) 
  
   
 Forecasted   
 123 (7%) 249 (9%) 
V-regime Did not forecast  (benchmark group)  1,094 (60%) 1,690 (62%) 
  
Total firm-years  
 
1,837 (100%) 
 
2,728 (100%) 
 
Panel B: Means (medians) of treatment vs. benchmark groups 
 
 Small Decrease  Small Increase 
 Treatment Benchmark   Treatment Benchmark  
N  520 1,094  664 1,690 
      
Forecast 0.133 0.040  0.169 0.054 
      
Timeliness 89 111  103 96 
 (66) (64)  (68) (67) 
      
Precision 2.108 2.094  2.088 2.261 
 (2) (2)  (2) (2) 
      
Error 0.332 0.388  0.163 0.183 
 (0.221) (0.129)  (0.120) (0.109) 
      
SOE 0.594 0.680  0.613 0.701 
      
Total Assets  7,584 5,575  17,442 17,372 
(In millions of RMB) (2,765) 
 
(2,390) 
  
(2,869) 
 
(2,754) 
 
Competition 6.485 5.837  5.905 5.412 
 
(4.639) 
 
(4.284) 
  
(4.409) 
 
(4.082) 
 
BM 0.694 0.731  0.595 0.640 
 
(0.666) 
 
(0.761) 
  
(0.567) 
 
(0.632) 
 
StdROA 0.030 0.024  0.037 0.022 
 (0.042) (0.020)  (0.021) (0.011) 
Follow 8.2 6.0  9.5 8.5 
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 (3) (1)  (4) (3) 
      
IO 0.182 0.151  0.207 0.197 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.067) 
  
(0.158) 
 
(0.130) 
 
Regulate 0.227 0.249  0.239 0.283 
      
Finance 0.102 0.042  0.104 0.063 
 
  
Panel C: Pearson correlations using the treatment and benchmark observations 
 
  Size Competition BM StdROA Follow IO Regulate Finance 
SOE 0.105 -0.092  0.131 -0.096 -0.083  0.007 0.126 -0.031 
Size  -0.103 0.366 -0.191 0.516 0.076 0.129 0.052 
Competition   0.007 0.093 0.069 -0.037 -0.194 0.034 
BM    -0.244 -0.127 -0.195 -0.029 -0.049 
StdROA     -0.026 -0.003 -0.031 -0.006 
Follow      0.178 0.015 0.101 
IO       0.036 0.076 
Regulate        -0.007 
 
 
Notes: See Appendix 3 for variable definitions. In Panel B we report the mean value of each variable and 
additionally report the median value in parentheses of a variable that is not a dummy. For Timeliness, 
Precision, and Error, only the forecasting observations of the treatment and benchmark groups are used. 
For Timeliness, the initial forecast is used if a firm provided more than one forecast for the year. For 
descriptive purposes, we winsorize timeliness at the 95%. In Panel C the correlations that are statistically 
significant at least at the 5% level are in bold.  
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TABLE 5 
Logit Model of Treatment vs. Benchmark and Subsequent Propensity-Score Matching 
 
   Comparison after propensity-score matching  
Logit model   Treatment Control  t-statistic 
SOE -0.139***  0.605 0.616 0.55 
 (-2.97)  
Size 0.067***  21.791 21.781 -0.20 
 (2.80)  
Competition 0.010*  6.156 6.108 -0.26 
 (1.77)  
BM -0.099  0.626 0.634 0.67 
 (-0.83)  
StdROA 9.815***  0.039 0.035 1.03 
 (13.41)  
Follow -0.006**  9.0 9.3 0.64 
 (-2.16)  
IO 0.124  0.196 0.195 -0.21 
 (1.03)  
Regulate -0.054  0.234 0.233 -0.10 
 (-1.03)  
Finance 0.380***  0.102 0.106 0.34 
 (4.58)  
Constant -2.091***     
 (-4.30)     
Year fixed effects Yes     
N 3,965  1,183 1,183  
Wald χ2 453.47***     
Pseudo R2 9.4%         
 
 
Note: In the logit model the dependent variable is 1 for a firm-year in the treatment group and 0 for a firm-
year in the benchmark group. The treatment group includes firm-years that issued a mandatory forecast in 
year t-1 and are in the V-regime in year t. The benchmark group includes firm-years that were in the V-
regime in year t-1 and did not issue any earnings forecast and are in the V-regime again in year t. See 
Appendix 3 for variable definitions. We report z–statistics for the logit model in parentheses. After the logit 
model estimation, for each observation in the treatment group we select a firm-year in the benchmark group 
that has the closest propensity score and refer to it as the “control” observation. The right columns compare 
the means of the treatment and control observations and report the between-group t-test statistics. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 6 
The Effect of Forced Forecast Experience in Year t’s Decision to Issue Voluntary Forecasts 
 
  Conditional logit model 
 Small earnings decrease Small earnings increase 
Treatment 2.826*** 2.664*** 
 (7.86) (8.34) 
SOE -0.793*** -1.060*** 
 (-3.62) (-5.76) 
Size -0.230* -0.189* 
 (-1.85) (-1.84) 
Competition 0.000 0.006 
 (-0.00) (0.33) 
BM -1.451*** -2.110*** 
 (-2.60) (-4.22) 
StdROA -3.617 -7.188** 
 (-1.19) (-2.55) 
Follow 0.029** 0.013 
 (2.47) (1.28) 
IO 0.194 -0.784 
 (0.34) (-1.46) 
Regulate -0.127 -0.306 
 (-0.44) (-1.23) 
Finance 0.481 0.612** 
 (1.50) (2.32) 
   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 1,040 1,326 
Pseudo R2 24.3% 33.3% 
 
Note: We estimate the conditional logit model using the treatment and control firm-years matched by 
propensity scores and identified in Table 5. The dependent variable, Forecast, is 1 for a firm-year in the V-
regime in year t that issues a voluntary forecast and 0 for a non-forecasting V-regime firm-year. Treatment 
is 1 for a firm-year in the treatment group (firm-years that issued a mandatory forecast in year t-1) and 0 for 
the matched control observation. See Appendix 3 for other variable definitions. We report z–statistics in 
parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
The Effect of Forced Forecast Experience on the Timeliness of Year t’s Voluntary Forecasts 
 
  First approach   Second approach 
  
Small earnings 
increase or decrease   
Small earnings 
decrease 
Small earnings 
increase 
Treatment 48.144***  30.253*** 53.296*** 
 (4.22)  (3.02) (3.38) 
SOE -9.809  3.422 47.788*** 
 (-0.77)  (0.30) (3.07) 
Size -5.674  -11.400** 14.995* 
 (-0.91)  (-2.00) (1.78) 
Competition -1.078  -0.575 -0.351 
 (-0.97)  (-0.52) (-0.23) 
BM -11.383  13.388 -47.383 
 (-0.35)  (0.45) (-1.02) 
StdROA -94.253  -207.308 238.416 
 (-0.52)  (-1.29) (1.05) 
Follow 0.514  0.628 -0.356 
 (0.94)  (1.11) (-0.36) 
IO -3.293  16.517 -46.168 
 (-0.12)  (0.62) (-1.05) 
Regulate -18.347  2.006 30.789 
 (-1.15)  (0.15) (1.51) 
Finance -5.528  8.177 7.246 
 (-0.21)  (0.42) (0.35) 
Constant 176.460  549.420*** -366.576** 
 (1.47)  (4.93) (-2.10) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes 
N 74  106 184 
Model F-statistic 43.86***  40.15*** 8.87*** 
 
Note: Under the first approach we retain observations in the original 1,183 pairs only if both the treatment 
and control firms issue voluntary forecasts in year t. Given the small sample size, we pool the two categories 
in the test. Under the second approach we keep the treatment observations that issue voluntary forecasts in 
year t, return to the original pool of 3,784 benchmark observations, and select from the forecasting 
benchmark observations the one with the closest propensity score for the forecasting treatment observation. 
The dependent variable is Timeliness. We estimate the linear regression using the robust-regression 
estimation method with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. We report z–statistics in parentheses. 
See Appendix 3 for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
The Effect of Forced Forecast Experience on the Accuracy of Year t’s Voluntary Forecasts 
 
  First approach   Second approach 
  
Small earnings 
increase or decrease   
Small earnings 
decrease 
Small earnings 
increase 
Treatment 0.034  0.023 0.001 
 (0.74)  (0.40) (1.54) 
SOE 0.049  -0.078 0.000 
 (0.93)  (-1.14) (0.70) 
Size -0.005  -0.011 -0.001** 
 (-0.23)  (-0.34) (-2.57) 
Competition 0.003  -0.001 0.000 
 (0.62)  (-0.14) (0.49) 
BM -0.018  0.178 0.003* 
 (-0.16)  (0.91) (1.72) 
StdROA 0.236  0.144 -0.007 
 (0.35)  (0.16) (-0.83) 
Follow -0.001  -0.001 0.000* 
 (-0.30)  (-0.25) (1.89) 
IO -0.063  0.270 -0.001 
 (-0.56)  (1.65) (-0.62) 
Regulate 0.257**  0.160 -0.001 
 (2.12)  (1.37) (-1.01) 
Finance -0.086  -0.126 0.001 
 (-1.45)  (-1.62) (1.13) 
Timeliness 0.000**  0.001*** 0.000 
 (2.16)  (3.06) (1.21) 
Constant 0.190  0.443 0.018*** 
 (0.42)  (0.70) (2.85) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes 
N 65  85 158 
Model F-statistic 2.20**  3.30*** 1.54* 
 
Note: Under the first approach we retain observations in the original 1,183 pairs only if both the treatment 
and control firms issue voluntary forecasts in year t. Given the small sample size, we pool the two categories 
in the test. Under the second approach we keep the treatment observations that issue voluntary forecasts in 
year t, return to the original pool of 3,784 benchmark observations, and select from the forecasting 
benchmark observations the one with the closest propensity score for the forecasting treatment observation. 
The dependent variable is Error. The variable would inflate when the scalar is close to 0; the number of 
observations used in this table is less than that in Table 6. We estimate the linear regression using the robust-
regression estimation method with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. We report z–statistics in 
parentheses. See Appendix 3 for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
The Effect of Forced Forecast Experience on SOEs vs. Non-SOEs 
 
Panel A: Means (medians) of treatment vs. benchmark groups partitioned by SOEs vs. Non-SOEs 
 
  Small Decrease   Small Increase 
 Treatment Benchmark   Treatment Benchmark  
 SOE Non_SOE SOE Non_SOE  SOE Non_SOE SOE Non_SOE 
N  309 211 744 350  407 257 1,185 505 
Forecast 0.081 0.209 0.028 0.091  0.096 0.284 0.035 0.099 
Timeliness 105 70 136 91  123 80 151 82 
 (70) (66) (64) (63)  (70) (67) (71) (66) 
Precision 2.16 1.977 2.048 2.125  2.231 0.161 2.357 2.18 
 (2) (2) (2) (2)  (2) (1) (3) (2) 
Error 0.326 0.335 0.299 0.359  0.168 0.161 0.292 0.096 
 (0.170) (0.233) (0.145) (0.109)  (0.103) (0.136) (0.187) (0.068) 
Total Assets  10,793 5,682 7,109 5,564  46,561 10,218 30,524 13,806 
(In millions of RMB) (3,733) (2,091) (2,340 2,091)  (3,259) (2,084) (2,956) (2,430) 
Competition 5.982 7.222 5.634 6.269  5.538 6.487 5.396 5.449 
 (4.130) (7.223) (4.132) (4.469)  (4.082) (4.639) (4.033) (4.284) 
BM 0.711 0.603 0.746 0.714  0.635 0.537 0.654 0.618 
 (0.749) (0.566) (0.771) (0.729)  (0.621) (0.509) (0.655) (0.587) 
StdROA 0.039 0.031 0.024 0.028  0.036 0.043 0.021 0.026 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.010) (0.020)  (0.020) (0.030) (0.010) (0.010) 
Follow 8.738 8.161 9.060 4.260  10.718 9.350 10.070 8.270 
 (3) (3) (4) (1)  (5) (4) (5) (2) 
IO 0.180 0.179 0.153 0.146  0.204 0.212 0.194 0.204 
 (0.120) (0.107) (0.064) (0.084)  (0.143) (0.174) (0.123) (0.158) 
Regulate 0.285 0.142 0.278 0.186  0.265 0.198 0.309 0.224 
Finance 0.120 0.107 0.048 0.020  0.104 0.105 0.096 0.020 
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Panel B: The decision to provide voluntary forecasts in year t 
 
 Conditional logit model 
 SOE  Non-SOE 
 
Small earnings 
decrease 
Small earnings 
increase  
Small earnings 
decrease 
Small earnings 
increase 
Treatment 2.752*** 3.156***  2.868*** 3.305*** 
 -3.89 -6.63  -6.16 -6.78 
Size 0.011 -0.107  -0.666*** -0.379** 
 -0.06 (-0.75)  (-3.24) (-2.28) 
Competition -0.144*** -0.002  0.054* -0.011 
 (-2.74) (-0.07)  -1.69 (-0.41) 
BM -0.492 -1.415**  -0.979 -2.580*** 
 (-0.55) (-2.08)  (-1.28) (-3.34) 
StdROA -7.867 -6.837  -4.428 -9.595** 
 (-1.27) (-1.51)  (-1.14) (-2.54) 
Follow 0.015 -0.008  0.047*** 0.032** 
 -0.8 (-0.46)  -2.83 -2.1 
IO 1.127 -0.567  -0.111 -1.780** 
 -1.4 (-0.78)  (-0.14) (-2.11) 
Regulate -0.27 -0.613*  -0.338 -0.034 
 (-0.66) (-1.71)  (-0.72) (-0.10) 
Finance -0.13 0.393  0.668 0.790** 
 (-0.24) -0.99  -1.46 -1.97 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 618 820  422 506 
Pseudo R2 16.65 18.7%  29.3% 38.0% 
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Panel C: The timeliness of voluntary forecasts in year t 
 
 The second approach of selecting treatment-control pairs 
 SOE  Non-SOE 
 Small earnings 
decrease 
Small earnings 
increase 
 Small earnings 
decrease 
Small earnings 
increase 
Treatment 20.151 44.68  97.131*** 86.705*** 
 (0.39) (1.54)  (77.18) (49.68) 
Size 3.682 22.410  -3.038*** -1.962* 
 (0.16) (1.58)  (-3.78) (-1.96) 
Competition -4.206 -3.622  -0.149 -0.067 
 (-0.60) (-1.33)  (-1.46) (-0.45) 
BM -129.391 -169.355***  3.254 7.367 
 (-0.89) (-3.09)  (0.87) (1.29) 
StdROA -131.780 -272.786  4.892 -31.525 
 (-0.18) (-0.60)  (0.41) (-1.36) 
Follow 1.097 -5.492***  0.145** 0.060 
 (0.54) (-3.37)  (2.46) (0.61) 
IO -38.069 54.210  -4.830* 2.226 
 (-0.34) (0.77)  (-1.75) (0.43) 
Regulate 78.051 122.160***  0.446 5.241** 
 (1.44) (3.38)  (0.27) (2.10) 
Finance 25.653 25.491  -0.985 -1.426 
 (0.42) (0.73)  (-0.68) (-0.65) 
Constant 132.109 -169.131  32.305** 19.746 
 (0.29) (-1.59)  (2.00) (0.99) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 46 74  80 90 
Model F-statistic 2.29** 5.07***   491.13*** 513.72*** 
 
Note: As in Table 5, we use the propensity score matching method in identifying a control observation for 
each treatment observation. Different from Table 5, for a SOE (non-SOE) treatment observation we select 
an SOE (non-SOE) from the benchmark group with the closest propensity score as the control observation. 
We estimate the SOE and non-SOE matched samples separately for the likelihood of voluntary forecasts in 
Panel B and for forecast timeliness in Panel C. See other notes for Tables 5, 6, and 7.   
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TABLE 10 
Insider Trading Analysis 
 
  Mandatory forecast group  (3,192) 
Control group  
(2,665) 
Between-group 
difference 
Good News Firms 
30 days before mandatory forecast date:    
 Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases 
# firm-years with 
insider trading (%) 46 (1.44%) 36 (1.13%) 41 (1.65%) 32 (1.20%) 
  
Mean  0.0004 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002   
       
30 days starting with mandatory forecast date:    
# firm-years with 
insider trading (%) 122 (3.82%) 37 (1.16%) 33 (1.24%) 16 (0.60%) 
  
Mean  0.0022 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001   
       
Change from pre to 
post -0.0018 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0018 -0.0002 
t-statistic -4.52*** -1.57 0.96 0.72 -4.86*** -1.70* 
Nonparametric test 
Z-statistic -5.15*** -1.63* 2.63*** 2.30** -5.98*** -1.95** 
Bad News Firms 
30 days before mandatory forecast date: 
 Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases 
# firm-years with 
insider trading (%) 13 (0.41%) 9 (0.28%) 15 (0.56%) 24 (0.90%) 
  
Mean  0.0003 0.0000 0.0017 0.0002   
       
30 days starting with mandatory forecast date:    
# firm-years with 
insider trading (%) 37 (1.16%) 25 (0.78%) 20 (0.75%) 16 (0.60%) 
  
Mean  0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000   
       
Change from pre to 
post -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0016 0.0002 -0.0017 -0.0003 
t-statistic -0.44 -1.58 1.80* 0.15 0.43 -0.03 
Nonparametric test 
Z-sat. -3.41*** -2.76*** 0.84 0.18 -3.66*** -0.79 
 
Note: Insider trading data are available for 2007-2011 from CSMAR. The database classifies executives and board of 
directors as insiders. We classify firms as having “Good news” if they have non-negative values of MFnews, and use 
reported earnings for year t as the pseudo-earnings forecast to calculate MFnews for the control firms. We classify all 
other firms as having “Bad news.” For each firm-year, we calculate the aggregate number of shares sold and purchased 
separately in the specified window and scale it by the number of outstanding shares at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
For firms in the V-regime that provide no forecasts (“control group”), we use the median mandatory forecast date of 
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60 days before the fiscal year end by the mandatory forecast group as a pseudo-event date. We pool the firm-years 
with positive insider trading from the four windows and winsorize the insider trading variable at 99th percentile and 
then add the firm-years with zero insider trading. We conduct the parametric t test and nonparametric Wilcoxon test. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 11 
Tests of Distribution Discontinuity around 50% Earnings Changes 
 
 Left of the 50%-change threshold   Right of the 50%-change threshold 
 Actual Predict Diff. Std. 
Test 
Statistic   Actual Predict Diff. Std.  
Test 
Statistic 
50% decrease threshold:           
1999-2000 (before)             
(-0.60,-0.55] 22      (-0.55,-0.50] 26     
(-0.55,-0.50] 26 25 1.0 4.62 0.22  (-0.50,-0.45] 28 24 4.0 4.70 0.85 
(-0.50,-0.45] 28      (-0.45,-0.40] 22     
             
2002-2003 (after)             
(-0.60,-0.55] 21      (-0.55,-0.50] 25     
(-0.55,-0.50] 25 46 -21.0 4.96 -4.24***  (-0.50,-0.45] 71 43.5 27.5 6.99 3.93*** 
(-0.50,-0.45] 71      (-0.45,-0.40] 62     
             
50% increase threshold:           
1999-2000 (before)             
[0.40, 0.45) 35      [0.45, 0.50) 21     
[0.45, 0.50) 21 27.5 -6.5 4.36 -1.49  [0.50, 0.55) 20 22.5 -2.5 4.16 -0.6 
[0.50. 0.55) 20      [0.55, 0.60) 24     
             
2002-2003 (after)             
[0.40, 0.45) 34      [0.45, 0.50) 35     
[0.45, 0.50) 35 33.5 1.5 5.36 0.28  [0.50, 0.55) 33 29.5 3.5 5.14 0.68 
[0.50. 0.55) 33      [0.55, 0.60) 24     
 
Note: We use two years’ data before the forecast mandate regarding 50% earnings changes and two years’ data after the mandate. “(” and 
“)” mean the number at the boundary is excluded and “[” and “]” mean the number at the boundary is included. Actual is the actual number 
of firm-years falling into a given interval. Predict is the number of firm-years falling into the interval assuming the distribution across the 
interval and its two adjacent intervals is smooth; that is, the value is the average number of observations in the adjacent intervals. Diff is 
Actual minus Predict. Std is the standard deviation calculated using the formula provided in Footnote 6 of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). 
The test statistic is Diff / Std and follows a standard normal distribution. *** indicates statistical significance at 1%. 
